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Abstract. Assuming a cryptographically strong cyclic group G of prime
order q and a random hash function H, we show that ElGamal encryption
with an added Schnorr signature is secure against the adaptive chosen
ciphertext attack, in which an attacker can freely use a decryption oracle
except for the target ciphertext. We also prove security against the novel
one-more-decyption attack. Our security proofs are in a new model, cor-
responding to a combination of two previously introduced models, the
Random Oracle model and the Generic model. The security extends to
the distributed threshold version of the scheme. Moreover, we propose a
very practical scheme for private information retrieval that is based on
blind decryption of ElGamal ciphertexts.
1 Introduction and Summary
We analyse a very practical public key cryptosystem in terms of its security
against the strong adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) of [RS92], in which
an attacker can access a decryption oracle on arbitrary ciphertexts (except for
the target ciphertext.) Let a signed ElGamal encryption of a message be an
ElGamal ciphertext together with a Schnorr signature of that ciphertext |
the public signature key is given by the ElGamal ciphertext. We prove that this
scheme is secure against generic attacks where both the group G and the random
hash function H are black boxes.
The traditional versus the new security model. Assuming a strong cyclic group
G and a random hash function H we prove tight bounds on the success proba-
bility of a generic attacker performing some t generic steps. Our approach has
practical consequences. It yields very practical cryptographic schemes that are
provably secure in a reasonable, new security model, the random oracle and
generic model (ROM+GM). The ROM goes back to Fiat and Shamir [FS86]
and has been further enhanced by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93], while the
generic model (GM) goes back to Nechaev [Ne94] and Shoup [Sh97]. We intro-
duce the combination of these two models, the result of which seems to cover all
practical attacks at hand. Namely, security in ROM+GM allows a separation of
potential weaknesses of the group G, the hash function H and the cryptographic
protocols using G and H. It allows a modular replacement of weak hash func-
tions or groups without forcing changes to the cryptographic protocols. Whereasthe security guarantees of most ecient groups and hash functions are merely
heuristics based on the absence of known attacks, we obtain tight bounds on
the success of arbitrary generic attacks. While we do not have to rely on any
unproven assumption, it is the case that our security guarantees hinge on the
existence of strong hash functions H and groups G for which the combination
(G;H) has no weaknesses. On the other hand, we do not assume that the dis-
crete logarithm (DL) problem or to the Die-Hellman problem is hard | our
security proof contains a hardness proof of the DL-problem in the generic model.
The new ROM+GM is a powerful tool for proving security against interactive
attacks. In this paper we merely consider encryption. For security in ROM+GM
of Schnorr signatures | in particular security of blind signatures against the
one-more signature forgery | see [SJ99]. Recently, it has been shown [Sc00]
that the generation of secret DL-keys from short random seeds through a strong
hash function is secure in GM.
Notions of security. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q with generator g,
and let Zq be the eld of integers modulo q. A Die-Hellman key pair consists of
a random secret key x 2 Zq and the corresponding public key h = gx 2 G. Die-
Hellman keys give rise to many cryptographic schemes, for example ElGamal
encryption [E85]. An ElGamal ciphertext of message m 2 G is a pair (gr;mhr) 2
G2 for random r 2 Zq. ElGamal encryption is indistinguishable [GM84] | it is
secure against a passive, merely eavesdroping adversary. Formally, an attacker,
given distinct messages m0;m1 and a corresponding target ciphertext cipb for
random b 2 f0;1g, cannot guess b better than with probability 1
2. However,
ElGamal encryption is completely insecure against various active attacks, where
a decryption oracle can be used under appropriate conditions.
A powerful active attack is the CCA-attack of Rackoff and Simon [RS92].
CCA-security means indistinguishability against an adversary that can freely
use a decryption oracle except for the target ciphertext. Dolev, Dwork and
Naor [DDN91] propose another notion of security against active attacks, called
non-malleability. Here the adversary | which is given a decryption oracle |
tries to create another ciphertext that is related in an interesting way to the
target ciphertext. Non-malleability and CCA-security have been shown to be
equivalent [DDN98].
Previous work. The public key encryption schemes of Shoup, Gennaro
[SG98], Cramer, Shoup [CS98], Abdalla, Bellare, Rogaway [ABR98],
Fujisaki, Okamoto [FO99], Shoup [Sh00] and Zheng, Seberry [ZS92] all
extend variants of ElGamal encryption by an added signature or tag. This idea
rst appears in [ZS92] without a security proof. CCA-security has been proved
in [SG98, CS98, ABR98, FO99, Sh00]. The schemes in [SG98, CS98, ABR98,
Sh00] either use an involved tag construction or key generation to simplify the
reduction to the discrete log or to the Die-Hellman problem, the tag in [ABR98]
uses symmetric encryption. We consider the very practical, signed extension
of ElGamal encryption, which was independently proposed by Tsiounis and
Yung [TY98] and Jakobsson [J98]. Herein, an ElGamal ciphertext (gr;mhr)
is completed by a Schnorr signature [Sc91] providing a proof of knowledge ofthe plaintext m and of the secret r | the public signature key gr is given by the
ciphertext. CCA-security of this signed ElGamal encryption has been shown in
[TY98] under the assumption that the signer really "knowns" the secret signature
key r. That assumption holds in the ROM if there is only a logarithmic number
of interactions with the decryption oracle.1
Our results. We "validate" the [J98,TY98]-assumption that the signer really
"knows" the secret key r in the ROM+GM. We give a plaintext extractor, and
we prove security against a generic CCA-attacker performing some number t =
o(
p
q) of interactions and generic group steps. A CCA-attacker can freely use
a decryption oracle except for the target ciphertext. We show that a generic
CCA-attacker using t generic steps, and given distinct messages m0;m1, a target
ciphertext cipb for random b 2R f0;1g, cannot predict b with probability better
than 1
2 +t2=q. This probability is over the random hash function H, the random
public encryption key h, the coin tosses of the encipherer, and the random bit
b. This bound is almost tight, as a generic attacker, given the public key h, can
compute the secret decryption key with probability
 t
2

=q in t generic steps. This
result improves the known security guarantees for signed ElGamal encryption.
Moreover, our security proofs extend to a straightforward distributed threshold
version of signed ElGamal encryption, see [SG98] for the threshold setting.
Furthermore, we introduce the one-more decryption attack and we show that
signed ElGamal encryption is secure against this attack. In the one-more de-
cryption attack the adversary attempts to partially decrypt `+1 ciphertexts by
asking a decryption oracle some ` times. The new attack is not covered by the
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, as the latter relates to a single target cipher-
text. Interestingly, security against the one-more attack follows from plaintext
awareness (PA) as dened in [BR94]. Proving PA is the core of the proof of The-
orem 1 and 2. 2 For motivation of the one-more decryption attack, we propose a
practical scheme for private information retrieval. It is based on blind decryption
and security against the random one-more attack | which is a weak version of
the one-more decryption attack.
Generalized (signed) ElGamal encryption. Finally, we propose a more general
variant of (signed) ElGamal encryption with two major advantages. Firstly, for
long messages our generalized encryption is very fast and its data expansion rate
approaches 1. Secondly, the generalized encryption does not require messages to
be encoded into the group generated by the public key h.3 Let the message space
1 The FFS-extractor of Feige-Fiat-Shamir, in the oracle replay mode of Pointcheval
and Stern [PS96], extracts the secret signature key from signed ElGamal encryp-
tions. The FFS-extractor has a constant delay factor, and thus can in polynomial
time at most be iterated a logarithmical number of times.
2 It seems that PA is the most important security notion for encryption. E.g.,
[BDPR98] show that PA and IND-CPA imply CCA-security while the converse does
not hold. PA requires the ROM, security proofs without assuming the ROM do not
prove PA.
3 Encoding of arbitrary bit sequences into sequences of group elements is easy for
particular groups such as Z

q that correspond to an interval of integers. For general
groups, even for subgroups of Z

N or subgroups of elliptic curves, an encoding intobe an arbitrary additive group M, e.g., M = Zn
q for some n. Let a generalized
ElGamal ciphertext be a pair (gr;m + HM(hr)) for random r 2 Zq, where
HM : G ! M is a random hash function. We then add a Schnorr signature
(using the public signature key gr) to the ciphertext (gr;m+HM(hr)) 2 GM.
This signed generalized ElGamal encryption has provably the same security as
signed ElGamal encryption, without any further assumptions.
The structure of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce the generic model for
interactive algorithms that use a hash oracle and an oracle for decryption. We
propose a setup for the GM that slightly diers from the [Sh97] proposal in that
we do not assume a random binary encoding of group elements. We examplify
the dierence of the two setups for the baby-step-giant-step DL-algorithm. While
our generic algorithms do not allow for ecient sorting of group elements this
does not aect the number of generic steps as equality tests of group elements
are free of charge.
In Section 3, we review signed ElGamal encryption, which is based on the
original ElGamal encryption. Moreover, we generalize the original and the signed
ElGamal encryption. Then we introduce the main tools for proving security in
the GM. We show in Lemma 1 and 2 that a collision-free, non-interactive generic
attacker A gets no information on the secret random data | the secret key,
the random number r , etc. | except that A observes the absence of collisions.
Lemma 1 bounds the probability for non-trivial collisions. This bound also covers
the leakage of secret information through the absence of collisions.
Section 4 presents the proof of CCA-security of signed ElGamal encryption in
the ROM+GM. It gives a generic extractor that extracts the signature key  r =
logg  h from a signed ElGamal ciphertext ( h;  f;c;z), produced by the attacker.
We also prove security against the one-more decryption attack. We motivate this
novel attack by interesting services for trading encrypted data.
2 The Random Oracle and the Generic Model
The Random Oracle Model (ROM). Let G be a group of prime order q
with generator g, a range M of messages, and let Zq denote the eld of integers
modulo q. Let H be an ideal hash function with range Zq, modelled as an oracle
that given an input (query) in GM, outputs a random number in Zq. Formally,
H is a random function H : GM ! Zq chosen at random over all functions of
that type with uniform probability distribution. There is an ongoing debate on
whether the assumption of a random hash function is realistic or too generous.
The problem is that random functions can in principle not be implemented by
public algorithms. Canetti, Goldreich, Halevi [CGH98] present an arti-
cial "counter-example" that is provably secure in the ROM but which cannot
be implemented in a secure way replacing the random oracle by a computable
group elements is impractical. Known extensions of ElGamal encryption | see e.g.,
[MOV] section 8.26 | do not solve this encoding problem.function family.4 Nevertheless, the security achievable in the ROM seems to in
practice eliminate all attacks at hand.
The Generic Model (GM). Generic algorithms for G do not use the binary
encodings of the group elements, as they access group elements only for group op-
erations and equality tests. Nechaev [Ne94] proves that the discrete logarithm
problem is hard in such a model. The generic model of algorithms was further
elaborated on by Shoup [Sh97]. We present the Shoup model in a slightly dier-
ent setup5 and we extend it to algorithms that interact with a decryption oracle.
Encryptions are for the private/public key pair (x;h), where x is random in Zq
and h = gx. We describe the extended generic model in detail, rst focusing on
non-interactive algorithms and thereafter on algorithms interacting with oracles
for hashing and decryption.
The data of a generic algorithm is partitioned into group elements in G and
non-group data. The generic steps for group elements are multivariate exponen-
tiations:
 mex: Zd
q  Gd ! G; (a1;:::;ad;g1;:::;gd) 7!
Q
i g
ai
i with d  0.
The cases d = 2;a1 = 1;a2 = 1 present multiplication/division. The case d = 0
presents inputs in G | e.g., g, h are inputs for the DL-computation.
Def. A (non-interactive) generic algorithm is a sequence of t generic steps6
 f1;:::;ft0 2 G (inputs) 1  t0 < t,
 fi =
Qi 1
j=1 f
aj
j for i = t0 + 1;:::;t, where (a1;:::;ai 1) 2 Zi 1
q depends
arbitrarily on i, the non-group input and the set COi 1 := f(j;k) j
fj = fk; 1  j < k  i   1g of previous collisions of group elements.
Typical non-group inputs are represented by elements in Zq | which we assume
to be given | various integers in Zq contained in given ciphertexts or signatures.
COt is the set of all collisions of the algorithm.
Some group inputs fi depend on random coin 
ips, e.g., the random public
key h = gx depends on the random secret key x 2R Zq. The probability space
consists of the random group elements of the input. The logarithms logg fi of the
4 In [CGH98] a mechanism for the implementation of random hash functions has
been added to the ROM. The articial "counter-example" is dened relative to that
mechanism using the function ensemble that implements the random oracle.
5 We count the same generic steps as in [Sh97]; however, we allow arbitrary multi-
variate exponentiations while Shoup merely uses multiplication and division. The
technical setup in [Sh97] looks dierent as groups G are additive and associated with
a random injective encoding  : G ! S of the group G into a set S of bit strings |
the generic algorithm performs arbitrary computations on these bit strings. Addi-
tion/subtraction is done by an oracle that computes (fifj) when given (fi);(fj)
and the specied sign bit. As the encoding  is random it contains only the informa-
tion about which group elements coincide | this is what we call the set of collisions.
6 We can allow a generic algorithm to perform a number t of generic steps, where t
varies with the input. We can let the algorithm decide after each step whether to
terminate depending arbitrarily on the given non-group data. Then the number t of
generic steps depends on the computed non-group data.random inputs fi play the role of secret parameters. Information about the secret
parameters can only be revealed by collisions. E.g., ga = fb
i implies logg fi = a=b.
We let the non-group input and the generator g not depend on random bits.
The output of a generic algorithm consists of
 non-group data that depend arbitrarily on the non-group input and on the
set COt of all collisions,
 group elements f1;:::;fd where the integers 1;:::;d 2 f1;:::;tg
depend arbitrarily on the non-group input and on COt.
For the sake of clairifying the GM, we give an example of a generic algorithm:
The baby-step-giant-step DL-algorithm. This algorithm is given q and
g;h 2 G and computes logg h 2 Zq in 2
p
q generic steps.
1. Compute k := d
p
qe; l := dq=ke so that lk  k < q  lk. The computation
of the non-group data k;l is for free.
2. Form the lists L1 := fgi j 0  i < kg in k   1 multiplications and
L2 := fhgjk j 0  j < lg in l multiplications. Clearly, L1 \ L2 6= ;.
3. Find a collision by testing all equalities gi = hgjk. Note that the detection
of the collision is for free. An equality implies logg h = i   jk mod q.
While this algorithm performs #L1  #L2 "free" equality tests, the corre-
sponding Turing machine | in the [Sh97]-setup | constructs a collision dier-
ently, using only O(
p
q log2 q) equality tests. It sorts the binary encodings of the
gi and inserts the encodings of hgjk into the sorted list.
Going back to the description of the model we work in, we now elaborate on
interactive, generic algorithms. We count the following generic steps :
 group operations, mex: Zd
q  Gd ! G; (a1;:::;ad;g1;:::;gd) 7!
Q
i g
ai
i ,
 queries to the hash oracle H,
 interactions with a decryption oracle (decryptor for short) | see 3.1 7.
A generic adversary A | attacking an encryption scheme | is an interac-
tive algorithm that interacts with a decryptor. It performs some t generic steps
resulting in t0  t group elements f1;:::;ft0. A iteratively selects the next generic
step | a group operation, a query to H, an interaction with the decryptor |
depending arbitrarily on the non-group input and on previous collisions of group
elements.
The input consists of the generator g, the public key h 2 G, the group order
q, a collection of messages and ciphertexts and so on, all of which can be broken
down into group elements and non-group data.
The computed group elements f1;:::;ft0 2 G are the group elements contained
in the input, such as g;h. When counting the number of group operations, we
count each input as one operation. As a decryptor interaction is counted as a
generic step the number t0 of group elements is bounded by the number t of
generic steps, t0  t. We have t = t0 for a non-interactive A.
7 Other types of interactions are possible for other signature/encryption schemes, other
cryptographic protocols using groups of non-prime order, groups of unknown order
or using several distinct groups.The given non-group data consists of the non-group data contained in the
input, the previous hash replies H(Q) of queries Q, and the set of previous
collisions of group elements.
A decryptor interaction (dened in subsection 3.1) is a two round determin-
istic protocol. A claimed ciphertext is send to the decryptor, which performs a
generic group operation using the secret decryption key x, veries the Schnorr
signature using the public key gr contained in the ciphertext, and | in case
that this signature is correct | outputs the decrypted message. If the signature
is invalid the decryptor outputs a random element of G. A's interactions with
the decryptor are sequential as the interleaving of these two-round interactions
is necessarily trivial.
A's output and transmission to the decryptor consists of non-group data NG
and previously computed group elements f, where NG and , 1    t0,
depend arbitrarily on given non-group data.
A's transmission to the hash oracle H depends arbitrarily on given group
elements and given non-group data. The probability space consists of the random
H and the random input group elements.
The restriction of the generic model is that A can use group elements only
for generic group operations, equality tests and for queries to the hash oracle,
whereas non-group data can be arbitrarily used without charge. The computed
group elements f1;:::;ft0 are given as explicit multiplicative combinations of
group elements in the input and from decryptor interactions. Let the group
elements in the input and from decryptor interactions be g1;:::;g`. By induction
on j, a computed fj 2 G is of the form fj = g
aj;1
1 :::g
aj;`
` , where the exponents
aj;1;:::;aj;` 2 Zq depend arbitrarily on given non-group data. A can arbitrarily
use the coecients aj;1;:::;aj;` from this explicit representation of fj. A generic
adversary is deterministic, which is not a restriction as its coin 
ips would be
useless.8
Trivial collisions. We call a collision (i;j) 2 COt trivial if fi = fj holds
with probability 1, i.e., if it holds for all choices of the secret data such as the
secret key x and the random bits r of the encipherer. We write fi  fj for
a trivial collision.9 Trivial collisions do not release any information about the
secret data while non-trivial collisions can completely release some secret data.
Trivial collisions can be ignored, and so, we can exclude them from COt so that
COt consists only of non-trivial collisions.
8 A could select interior coin 
ips that maximize the probability of success | there is
always a choice for the internal coin 
ips that does not decrease A's probability of
success. It is useless for A to generate random group elements | in particular ones
with unknown DL. Using one generic step, A could replace random elements in G
by some deterministic g
a where a 2 Zq is chosen as to maximize the probability of
success.
9 Trivial collisions occur in testing correctness of an ElGamal ciphertext (g
r;mh
r) and
its message m. In case of a correct message-ciphertext pair the test results in a trivial
collision. Also, identical repetitions of a group operation yield a trivial collision.3 Signed ElGamal Encryption, Non-interactive Attacks.
We dene Schnorr signatures, based on an ideal hash function H : GM ! Zq,
where M is the set of messages. Hereafter we dene signed ElGamal encryption as
well as the generalized concepts of the original and of signed ElGamal encryption.
Lemma 1 and 2 are our main tools for proving security in GM. These show
| for a collision-free attacker | that the secret data x;r, etc. are stat. indep. of
all non-group data. There is, however, a minor leakage of secret information as
the secret data are not perfectly random in the absence of collisions. We show
in Prop. 2 that ElGamal encryption is indistinguishable (or semantically secure)
against generic non-interactive attacks. Prop. 2 is part of the CCA-security proof
of Theorem 1.
Private/public key for signatures. The private key x is random in Zq. The
corresponding public key h = gx 2 G is random in G, x = logg h.
A Schnorr signature on a message m is a triple (m;c;z) 2 MZ2
q such that
H(gzh c;m) = c. In order to sign a message m 2 M, pick a random r 2R Zq,
compute gr, c := H(gr;m) and z := r + cx. Output the signature (m;c;z).
In order to verify a signature (m;c;z) check that H(gzh c;m) = c. The
signing protocol produces a correct signature since gzh c = gr+cxh c = gr.
3.1 Denition of Signed ElGamal Encryption.
The private/public key pair for encryption is x, h = gx where x is random in Zq.
The basic encryption scheme is for messages in M = G, ElGamal ciphertexts are
in GM, the added Schnorr signature signs pairs in GM and uses a random
hash function H : G2  M ! Zq. We also propose a generalized scheme, where
the message space M is an arbitrary additive group.
In order to encipher a message m 2 G, we pick random r;s 2R Zq, com-
pute gr, mhr, c := H(gs;gr;mhr) and z := s + cr and output the ciphertext
(gr;mhr;c;z) 2 G2  Z2
q.
A decryption oracle (decryptor) is a function that decrypts valid ciphertexts:
The user sends a claimed ciphertext ( h;  f;c;z) to the decryptor. The decryptor
checks that H(gz h c; h;  f) = c and sends, if that test succeeds, m :=  f= hx to the
user. If the test fails the decryptor sends a random message in G. For simplicity,
we disregard the impact of that random message to the probability.
The decryption is correct as  h = gr,  f = mhr yields  f= hx = mgrxg rx = m.
Remarks 1. A signed ciphertext (gr;mhr;c;z) consists of an ElGamal cipher-
text (gr;mhr) and a Schnorr signature (c;z) of the "message" (gr;mhr) for the
public signature key gr. The signature (c;z) does not contain any information
about m as (c;z) depends on m exclusively via some hash value that is statisti-
cally independent of m.
2. Threshold Distributed Version. The validity of the ciphertext ( h;  f;c;z)
is tested prior to and separate from decryption. Hence, the security properties of
the scheme are preserved in the more general setting of threshold cryptography,
see [SG98]. It is possible for a distributed entity to perform the decryption in acontrolled manner after each server rst having veried that indeed the decryp-
tion is allowed i.e., that the signature in the ciphertext is valid. If this were not
locally veriable, it would make a threshold decryption severely more complex.
3. Comparison with other secure DL-cryptosystems. We count the num-
ber of exponentiations per encryption/decryption and the number of on-line exp.
per enc. (exponentiations not depending on the message). 10
exp./enc. on-line/enc. exp./dec.
Signed ElGamal enc. 3 0 2
[FO99] El Gamal 2 2 2
[ABR 98] 2 0 1
[CS98], [Sh00] 4 1 2
[SG98], TDH1, TDH2 5 2 5
The relative eciency of [FO99], [ABR98] is due to the usage of further
cryptographic primitives. [FO99] uses private encryption, [ABR98] uses private
encryption and message authentication code. Signed ElGamal encryption and
TDH1, TDH2 of [SG98] are amenable to a secure distributed threshold de-
cryption. Signed EG-encryption and the [FO99] EG-scheme are plaintext aware.
Signed ElGamal encryption virtually combines all the good properties.
Generalized (signed) ElGamal encryption. Let the message space M be
an arbitrary additive group, e.g., M = Zn
q. Let H : G2  M ! Zq be a random
hash function and let HM : G ! M be a second random hash function that
is statistically independent of H. Then replace in the basic encryption scheme
mhr 2 G by m + HM(hr) 2 M.
The generalized ElGamal ciphertext is (gr;  f), where  f = m + HM(hr),
the generalized signed ElGamal ciphertext is (gr;  f;c;z), and c = H(gs;gr;  f),
z = s + cr. Decrypt a signed ciphertext ( h;  f;c;z) into  f   HM( hx) provided
that the signature (c;z) of ( h;  f) is correct, i.e., H(gz h c; h;  f) = c.
For M = Zn
q the bit length of the ciphertext is log2 kGk + (n + 2)log2 q, the
message is nlog2 q bits long and kGk is the bit length of the group elements.
The data expansion rate is 1 + 2
n +
log2 kGk
nlog2 q which is near to 1 for large n.
The short generalized ciphertexts are as secure as the original ones. Encryp-
tion requires only a long11 and a short hash as well as a long and a short addition.
The three exponentiations gr;hr;gs can be done beforehand.
3.2 Basic Tools for Proving Security in GM
This subsection studies to a generic, non-interactive adversary A that performs
some t generic steps in attacking the indistinguishability of ElGamal encryption.
10 We count an expression g
z h
 c as 1 exponentiation even though it is slightly more
expensive than a full exponentiation.
11 Long hash values in Z
n
q can be generated using a random hash function HM : G ! Z
n
q
according to the following, or some related, approach: (HM(f;1);:::;HM(f;n)).Given q, the public key h = gx, two messages m0;m1 2 G and an ElGamal
ciphertext cipb = (gr;mbhr) for random r;x 2R Zq and b 2R f0;1g, A guesses
b. We show that A does not succeed better than with probability 1
2 + 2
 t
2

=q.
The probability space consists of the random group elements gr;gx;mbgrx,
or equivalently of the random r;x 2R Zq and b 2R f0;1g. Let A compute the
group elements f1;:::;ft. We let the Main Case be the part of the probability
space where there are no non-trivial collisions among f1;:::;ft, i.e., COt = ;.
Lemma 1. Non-trivial collisions among f1;:::;ft occur at most with probability
2
 t
2

=q. The probability refers to the random b;r;x.
Proof. In order to prove the claim we show for i < j, fi 6 fj, for constant b and
random r;x 2 Zq that Prr;x[fi = fj]  2
q. This implies
Prr;x[COt 6= ;] 
P
1i<jt Prr;x[fi = fj]  2
 t
2

=q.
The input group elements are g;gr;h;mbhr;m0;m1. Let logg m0;logg m1 be
given, then all computed group elements are explicit combinations of (g1;g2;g3;g4)
= (g;gr;h;mbhr), thus fj =
Q4
=1 g
aj;
 where the exponents aj;1;:::;aj;4 2 Zq
depend arbitrarily on given non-group data, but not on b;r;x. Consider r;x
as formal variables over Zq. Then logg fj is a polynomial in Zq[r;x] of the form
aj;1+aj;2r+aj;3x+aj;4(logg mb+rx). The dierence polynomial logg fi logg fj 2
Zq[r;x] has total degree d  1 as we assume that trivial collisions have been elim-
inated. Importantly, trivial collisions do not depend on b. 12 As 1  d  2, the
probability that fi(r;x) = fj(r;x) for random r;x is13 at most 2
q, thus proving
the claim. Here we use a Lemma attributed to Schwartz [Sch80] 14 u t
The leakage of secret information through the absence of collisions. Here we
pay attention to the fact that b;r;x are not perfectly random if COt = ;. By
Lemma 1 a 2
 t
2

=q-fraction of the probability space is excluded in the Main Case.
The Shannon entropy of the secret parameters b;r;x decreases accordingly. We
can neglect this minor leakage of secret information through the absence of
collisions. Thus, for a "collision-free" attacker the secret data are statistically
indepependent of the computed non-group data:
Lemma 2. In the Main Case the random b;r;x are stat. indep. of the computed
non-group data except that the b;r;x leading to collisions are excluded.
Proof. The random b;r;x; enter into the generic computation only via the group
elements gr;gx;mbgrx. Therefore, b;r;x enter into non-group data only via non-
trivial collisions of group elements. u t
12 The formal polynomial logg fi   logg fj 2 Zq[r;x] is of the form c1 + c2r + c3x +
c4(logg mb +rx). The coecients c1;:::;c4 2 Zq only depend on q and previous non-
trivial collisions. If fi  fj holds for some b 2 f0;1g then c4 = 0 and fi  fj holds
for all b 2 f0;1g. Hence the identity fi  fj does not depend on b.
13 The factor 2 disappears if mbh
r is removed from the input | then the dierence
polynomial has total degree at most 1.
14 Lemma [Sch80] A multivariate polynomial F 2 Zq[X1;:::;Xk] of total degree d sat-
ises for random x1;:::;xk 2 Zq that Prx1;:::;xk[F(x1;:::;xk) = 0]  d=q.Proposition 1. Generic DL-Complexity Lower Bound [Ne94,Sh97]. Let A, upon
input g and h = gx 2R G, output y 2 Zq. Then Prx[y = logg h] 
 t
2

=q + 1
q.
Proof. We use Lemma 1 and 2 for a generic A with input g;h | without inputs
gr;mbhr. The factor 2 in Lemma 1 disappears as the polynomials logg fj have
total degree  1. For a collision-free A, x is statistically independent of the
non-group output y, and thus Prh[y = logg h] = 1
q. By Lemma 1, non-trivial
collisions occur at most with probability
 t
2

=q. u t
Proposition 2. Indistinguishability. Let a generic, non-interactive A be given
g;h, two messages m0;m1 2 G and a ciphertext (gr;mbhr) for random r 2R Zq
and b 2R f0;1g. Let A output a guess b0 for b. Then Prb;x;r[b0 = b]  1
2 +2
 t
2

=q.
Proof. In the Main Case b;r;x are stat. indep. of the non-group output b0, thus
Prb;x;r[b0 = b] = 1
2. The Main Case occurs except with probability 2
 t
2

=q. u t
Extension 1. Obviously Prop.2 extends to generalized ElGamal ciphertexts
(gr;m + HM(hr)) for a random function HM : G ! M. Whereas A can arbi-
trarily use the hash values HM(f1);:::;HM(ft) of the computed group elements
these hash values are statistically independent random numbers except for col-
lisions fi = fj.
Extension 2. Prop. 2 extends to signed ElGamal encrytion and to generalized
signed ElGamal encrytion. This is because the added Schnorr signature does not
contain any information about the plaintext.
4 Security Against Interactive Attacks
We study the security of signed ElGamal encryption in ROM+GM. Signed El-
Gamal encryption was independently proposed by Tsiounis and Yung [TY98]
and Jakobsson [J98]. We show in Theorem 1 that this scheme is indistinguish-
able against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (CCA). This is equivalent to
non-malleability against CCA [DDN98]. We refer to non-malleability as dened
in [DDN98] and to the strong chosen ciphertext attack proposed by Rackoff
and Simon [RS92]. The adversary has access to a decryption oracle which can
be used arbitrarily except for the target ciphertext.
Moreover, we introduce the one-more-decryption attack and we show in Theo-
rem 2 that signed ElGamal encryption is secure against this attack. An adversary
can | after some ` interactions with the decryption oracle | not decrypt more
than ` ciphertexts. More precisely, he gets non-negligible information about at
most ` encrypted plaintexts. The core of the proof of Theorems 1 and 2 shows
that signed ElGamal encryption is plaintext aware. Therefore, the attackers de-
cryption requests for self-constructed ciphertexts can be eliminated.
Theorem 1 proves indistinguishability against a CCA-adversary A. The ad-
versary is given a target ciphertext cipb and a decryption oracle for the decryp-
tion of arbitrary ciphertexts except for cipb. The attack is called adaptive because
the queries to the decryption oracle may depend on the challenges and their cor-
responding answers. We let the generic adversary A perform some t genericsteps: group operations, inputs in G, queries to the oracle H, and queries to the
decryption oracle not including the target ciphertext.
Theorem 1. Let the attacker A be given g;h, distinct messages m0;m1, a target
ciphertext cipb corresponding to mb for a random bit b 2R f0;1g, and oracles
for H and for decryption. Then a generic A using t generic steps cannot predict
b with a better probability than 1
2 + t2=q. The probability space consists of the
random x;H;b and the coin tosses r of the encipherer.
Proof. We present a generic extractor E that extracts the secret key  r = logg  h
from a signed ciphertext ( h;  f;c;z) produced by A. Given  r; h;  f =  m h r the
plaintext  m can be extracted in one generic step. Thus, signed ElGamal encryp-
tion is | in a generic way | plaintext aware as dened in [BR94].
Let ( h;  f;c;z) be the rst claimed ciphertext that A transmits to the de-
cryptor. A has produced it without interacting with the decryptor. Let this
non-interactive, generic computation compute group elements f1;:::;ft0, t0  t.
By Lemma 1 non-trivial collisions among f1;:::;ft0 occur with probability no
more than 2
 t
2

=q. By Lemma 2 the secret b;r;x are statistically independent of
the non-group data of a collision-free computation of ( h;  f;c;z).
In the ROM the equation c = H(gz h c; h;  f), required for a valid signature,
necessitates that A selects c from given hash values H(f;fj;  f) for given group
elements f, fj =  h,  f. Otherwise, the equation c = H(gz h c; h;  f) holds with
probability 1
q as H is random. A gets c = H(f;fj;  f) from the hash oracle15
and must compute z so that gz h c = f, i.e., A must compute z = logg(ffc
j).
The computed z does not depend on x;r whereas logg(ffc
j) may depend. We
distinguish between the two values as follows: We let z0 := logg(ffc
j) denote the
value required for a signature, whereas the computed z is from A's transmission
(fj;  f;c;z).
Let the target ciphertext be cipb = (gr;mbhr;cb;zb), where the random
r;x 2R Zq, b 2R f0;1g are secret and h = gx. Let logg m0;logg m1 be given, then
A's group steps refer to the given group elements (g1;g2;g3;g4) := (g;gr;h;mbhr).
A computes fi :=
Q4
=1 g
ai;
 for i = 1;:::;t0 using exponents ai;1;:::;ai;4 2 Zq
that arbitrarily depend on given non-group data, but not on b;r;x. Hence z0 is
of the form
z0 = logg(ffc
j)
= a;1+caj;1+(a;2+caj;2)r+(a;3+caj;3)x+(a;4+caj;4)(logg mb+rx).
Considering r;x as formal variables over Zq, z0 is a polynomial in Zq[r;x]. The
random b;c;r;x are statistically independent of a;1;:::;a;4;aj;1;:::;aj;4.
Obviously z0 has total degree d = 0 if and only if a;k + caj;k = 0 for
k = 2;3;4. If the total degree d is non-zero then 1  d  2, and thus z0 = z(c)
holds with probability at most 2
q for random r;x and arbitrary functions z(c).
There are two subcases of the case d = 0: either fj = gaj;1, f = ga;1 or
a;k =  caj;k for k = 2;3;4. The second case occurs with probabilty  1
q as the
hash value c is statistically indepependent of a;k;aj;k.
15 A's choice of c; is determined by the claimed ciphertext ( h;  f;c;z) via f = g
z h
 c.Thus, a collision-free A succeeds not better than with probability 3
q in gen-
erating a correct signature (c;z) except that A sets fj = gaj;1, f = ga;1. So,
let the extractor E compute  r := aj;1 by mimicking A's computation of  h = fj.
Eliminating all interactions with the decryptor. The plaintext corresponding
to ( h;  f;c;z) is  f=hlogg  h =  f=haj;1 except for a probability 3
q. This eliminates
the rst interaction with the decryptor and the call for H(f;fj;  f)16 using one
generic step for computing  f=haj;1. This decreases the number of generic steps
and reduces A's probability of success by at most 3
q. Let there be ` interactions
with the decryptor. We iteratively eliminate them by the above method.17 This
transforms A into a non-interactive generic A0 that performs t ` generic steps.
Proposition 2 applies to the non-interactive A0, because the Schnorr signature in
cipb is useless for decryption.18 Also, the oracle H is useless without a decryptor.
Thus, the non-interactive A0 predicts b with a probability not exceeding (t  
`)2=q+ 1
2. This proves Theorem 1 as (t `)2+3`  (t `+`)2 = t2 for t `  3.
Note that t   `  4 due to the input group elements g;gr;h;mbhr. 2
Theorem 1 can easily be extended to the one-more decryption attack.
Theorem 2. Let the attacker A be given g;h, ciphertexts cip1;:::;cipd, the cor-
responding messages m1;:::;md in random order and oracles for H and for de-
cryption. Let the generic A perform t generic steps including some ` < d arbi-
trary queries to the decryption oracle. Then A cannot produce ` + 1 message-
ciphertext pairs with a probability better than 1
d ` + t2=q. The probability space
consists of the random x;H, the coin tosses of the encipherer and the random
ordering of the messages.
Proof. We have shown that signed ElGamal encryption is plaintext aware, and
the attacker can only construct ciphertexts corresponding to known plaintexts. In
particular, the adversary A can be transformed into a generic adversary A0 that
does not query the decryptor about any self-constructed ciphertext, performs t
generic steps and succeeds essentially with the same probability as A. A0 can only
query the decryption oracle about ` of the input ciphertexts. These ` decryptions
give no information about the d ` remaining input ciphertexts. This is because
the random bits of the ciphertexts are stat. indep. We can therefore eliminate
the ` decryptions and the resulting ` message-ciphertext pairs. This transforms
A0 into a non-interactive adversary where the argument of Lemma 1 applies.
16 The transformed A gets the plaintext  f=h
aj;1 of the rst decryptor interaction with-
out using the signature and its hash value required for the decryption request. If
A does not get c from the oracle H we remove the call for decrypting ( h;  f;c;z)
decreasing the number of generic steps and decreasing A's probability of success by
at most
1
q.
17 This iterative elimination is impossible in the ROM without assuming the GM, see
footnote 1.
18 The signature contained in a ciphertext does not reveal any information about the
message m. The signature depends on m exclusively via the hash value c that is
statistically independent of m.Consider the impact of a random permutation of the remaining d   ` messages
for a collision-free attacker. By Lemma 2 the random permutation is statistically
independent of A0's guess of a correct message-ciphertext pair. Therefore, A0
cannot guess a correct pair with a probability better than 1
d `. By Lemma 1
non-trivial collisions occur with probability at most 2
 t
2

=q, hence the claim. u t
Trading encrypted information. Suppose a user wants to buy sensitive dig-
ital information, e.g., digital music, videos, pictures, stock market analysis, etc.
Let the digital information be freely accessible in encrypted form in a public
data bank. For simplicity, let each encrypted package cost $1. Let the users have
access to a public decryption oracle that charges $1 per decryption. For the se-
curity of such trade of encrypted information the encryption scheme must be
secure against the one-more decryption attack.
This type of service does not require CCA-security. However, it would be nice
to have an encryption that allows for blind decryption so that no information
is revealed in a decryptor interaction. Blind decryption guarantees anonymity
of the buyer of digital information. It is well known that the original ElGamal
ciphertexts allow for blind decryption.19 Even though, ElGamal encryption is
insecure against the one-more decryption attack we show below that it is secure
against the weaker random one-more attack, where the enciphered plaintexts are
statistically independent messages | e.g. secret keys that are unknown to the
attacker.
Ecient scheme for private information retrieval (PIR). Let the infor-
mation packages mi of the public data bank be each encrypted under a private
key ki of a secure symmetric encryption scheme. Let mi contain a content de-
scription descri of mi and a signed ElGamal ciphertext cip(ki) = (gr;kihr;c;z)
of the key ki 2 G. Let (c;z) be a signature of (gr;kihr;descri) with public key
gr. Suppose a user wants to anonymously buy ` packages mi of his choice. He
checks the Schnorr signature (c;z) of cip(ki) = (gr;kihr;c;z) in package mi and
stops if the signature is invalid. Otherwise, he blinds the ElGamal ciphertext
(gr;kihr) into (gr+s;ukihr+s) for random s 2 Zq, u 2 G, and asks the decryp-
tion oracle to decrypt (gr+s;ukihr+s). As the blinded ciphertext is statistically
independent of (gr;kihr) no information is revealed about which ki he gets. As
the user pays for ` decryptions it is important that he cannot get ` + 1 keys ki.
Security against the random one-more attack. Consider the above PIR for
random ki 2 G. Clearly, `+1 keys ki 2R G have Shannon entropy (`+1)log2 q.
But each decryption reveals no more than log2 q bits of a plaintext in G, jGj = q.
Thus, ` decryptions cannot reveal ` + 1 statistically independent keys ki.
Another application would be an electronic service for delivering sensitive,
possibly unpleasant messages like court orders, summons, admonitions and so
on. Such messages can be sent in encrypted form, given access to a decryption
oracle that combines the decryption with an acknowledgement of the receipt
19 Blind decryption of the ElGamal ciphertext (g
r;mh
r): The user picks random u 2 G
and s 2 Zq and asks for decryption of (g
r+s;umh
r+s). He gets m from the plaintext
um transmitted by the decryptor by multiplication with u
 1.of the decrypted message. This makes sure that a recipient can only read the
message by acknowledging receipt. For such a service it would be important that
the encrytion is CCA-secure, so that the receipt correctly species the revealed
message. However, we also need security against the one-more decryption attack
as users may want to decrypt several ciphertexts. Signed ElGamal encryption
can be used for such a service.
Security of Schnorr signatures with short hash values. Let the hash
values of H be random in an interval [0;2k[ [0;q [ = Zq. The size of that
interval enters into the proof of Theorem 1 merely at the point, where we argue
that the case a;k =  caj;k for k = 2;3;4 has probability  1
q. For random
hash values c 2R [0;2k[ that case has probability  2 k.
Consequently, in the case of Theorem 1 a CCA-attacker does not succeed
better than with probability 1
2 + t2=q + `(2 k   1
q), where ` is the number of
decryptor interactions. This shows that random hash values can securely range
over a set of
p
q values.
Security of Schnorr Signatures in the ROM+GM. The proof of Theorem
1 contains a security proof for Schnorr signatures in the ROM+GM:
Corollary 1. Let A be a generic algorithm that is given g, the public signature
key h 2R G and a random hash oracle. Using t generic steps | group operations
and hash queries | A cannot produce a Schnorr signature with a probability
better than 3
q +
 t
2

=q. The probability space consists of the random h;H.
Security against the chosen message attack. Corollary 1 extends to the
case that the adversary A has a signature oracle and can ask the oracle for
signatures on messages of its choice. An interaction with the signature oracle is
counted as generic step. The goal of the attack is to generate a new signature
which is not produced by the signature oracle. The proof of the extension is
straightforward.
Unlike the case of Theorems 1 and 2, Corollary 1 and its extension have
a counterpart in the ROM without assuming the GM, see Pointcheval and
Stern [PS96]. Howewer, the security theorems and their proofs in the ROM use
completely dierent arguments | the probability bounds are less tight.
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